A comment on "Corruption in Belgium" by Maesschalck, Jeroen
 
 
 
 
Corruption in today’s Belgium 
 
Edited by 
Estelle Cantillon 
 
Lead Piece by 
Antonio Estache 
 
Comments by 
Jeroen Maesschalck 
François Vincke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2	  
 
Re-Bel e-book 17 | May 2015 
 
The Re-Bel initiative aims to rethink in depth, in an open, rigorous, 
non-partisan way, what the institutions of the Belgian federal state - 
or of whatever else this part of the world needs to become - can and 
must look like in the longer term, taking full account of the evolving 
European context. 
 
The Re-Bel initiative does not aim to produce one programme or 
manifesto to which everyone involved could subscribe. Its ambition 
is rather to provide a fertile intellectual environment in which new 
ideas and promising initiatives of all sorts can germinate and develop, 
with a concern for their relevance to a thorough reform of Belgium's 
institutions, but also to the institutional design of other complex 
polities, most obviously the European Union. 
The Re-Bel initiative involves scholars from all Belgian universities, 
runs a web site, publishes e-books and organizes workshops and 
public events. It intends to associate to its activities both foreign 
colleagues and the Brussels-based international community. The 
working language will usually be English. 
The Re-Be initiative is supported by the University Foundation, 
which will host all its activities. The University Foundation was 
founded in Brussels in 1920 at the initiative of Herbert Hoover and 
Emile Francqui. One of its missions, also central in the Re-Bel 
initiative, is to foster fruitful contacts and collaboration between 
academics of all Belgian universities. 
Each contribution to a Re-Bel e-book is written under the sole 
responsibility of its author. The views expressed in it cannot be 
assumed to be shared by either the Re-Bel initiative as such or the 
University Foundation. 
 
Re-Bel initiative 
www.rethinkingbelgium.eu 
contact@rethinkingbelgium.eu 
 
Coordination: 
Paul De Grauwe 
Philippe Van Parijs 
In partnership with  
the University Foundation 
rue d'Egmontstraat 11, 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
www.universityfoundation.be 
3	  
 
Table of contents 
 
 
Preface 
Estelle Cantillon 
 
4 
Lead Piece 
Corruption in Belgium: A policy-oriented survey of facts, 
figures and failures 
Antonio Estache 
 
5 
A Comment on Corruption in Belgium 
Jeroen Maesschalck 
25 
 
Corruption in Belgium: Comments 
François Vincke 
 
35 
  
4	  
 
Preface 
 
Belgium seems to have an odd relationship with corruption. While most people condemn it, many 
consider (minor) occurrences of corruption as inevitable. Likewise, while evidence shows that 
corruption harms competitiveness and growth and a number of indicators point to the 
underperformance of Belgium in the fight against corruption, the current government agreement 
does not contain any mention of anti-corruption measures, despite a first chapter devoted to 
competitiveness and employment.1   
In this fascinating e-Book, based on a Re-Bel event that took place in December 2013, Antonio 
Estache, Jeroen Maesschalck and François Vincke take turns sharing their analysis of the drivers, 
prevalence, consequences and cures of corruption in Belgium. Their perspectives complement one 
another very nicely and offer some answers to the paradox. While it would be impossible for me to do 
proper justice to their analysis in this brief preface, I can’t help but note a vicious cycle at play in 
explaining the low salience that corruption has in the public debate. Belgium’s lack of commitment to 
fighting corruption means that the relevant data to detect and measure corruption are not collected, 
which reduces accountability (we live in the happy world of ignorance), which, in turn, facilitates 
corruptive practices and reduces the incentives for those in power to fight them. Breaking this vicious 
cycle is not easy: the main beneficiaries are taxpayers who are dispersed and have very small 
incentives individually by definition, and future generations who are not even represented. In 
addition, both Antonio Estache and Jeroen Maeschalck identify several cultural and institutional 
specificities of Belgium, such as the important role that political parties take or the strong tradition of 
hierarchical rather than procedural enforcement, that facilitate the current state of affairs. All three 
authors nevertheless outline different measures and approaches to effectively tackle corruption. This 
is also an area where Belgium could usefully learn from best practices abroad.  
 
 
Estelle Cantillon 
Member of the Executive Committee of the Re-Bel initiative 
                                                                          
 
1 See http://www.premier.be/sites/default/files/articles/Accord_de_Gouvernement_-
_Regeerakkoord.pdf (accessed May 19, 2015). Paradoxically, the government agreement does mention 
corruption when it says that Belgium will condition its aid to developing countries on the recipient’s 
performance on the fight against corruption (p. 205).  
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Lead Piece
Corruption in Belgium: A policy-oriented 
survey of facts, figures and failures1 
 
Antonio Estache (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper has been prepared at the request of Re-Bel as a follow up to a public seminar organized in 
December 2013 to discuss corruption in Belgium.2 Its main goals are to: 
– take stock of the evidence on the level, type and possible sources of corruption in Belgium, if 
any, in absolute and relative terms, based on publically available data collected by 
international and national official agencies and watchdogs, and  
– use that information to identify the reform needs and limits to eliminate or at least cut, the 
risks of governance failures that could favour corruption in Belgium.  
First is the bad news:  It’s nearly impossible to achieve these goals within the scope of this paper. The 
topic is complex. It is not because corruption is viewed as a crime in most countries that it is easy to 
document and analyse. Most of the evidence is based on partial indicators produced by international 
sources and almost all of it is based on perception rather than on objective indicators. This evidence 
shows that corruption is multidimensional and that there are often inconsistencies across indicators, 
across countries and sometimes within the regions of a same country. Within countries, differences 
are particularly challenging because the national law is for all regions, but perceptions may differ 
across regions as a function of culture and local conventions as to what is corrupt and what is not.3 
Finally, this is one policy area for which a lot of relevant, more objective, information tends to be 
confidential. Therefore, this paper can only hope to be a modest effort towards achieving these goals. 
It should, however, help identify some of the key dimensions of what a fuller discussion could cover.4 
                                                                          
 
1 I am grateful to E. Cantillon for comments and suggestions. Any misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding is however my responsibility and should not be attributed to any of the institutions I 
am affiliated with. 
2 “Corruption and Regulation in Belgium”, December 19, 2013 and the programs is available on 
http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-events/tenth-public-event-corruption-regulation-
today-belgium 
3  Maesschalck  and Van de Walle (2006) deal with this when they assess the role of federalism in 
defining the level of corruption. 
4  See Peeters (2006) for a useful discussion of the Belgian peculiarities.  
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Second is the good news: a core minimal discussion is still feasible because, across countries, the 
concept of corruption has a common backbone and a fair amount of information is available on this 
backbone for Belgium. Corruption is usually defined in criminal codes around the world as illegal or 
fraudulent conduct by civil servants, politicians or political appointees (across government levels and 
across public enterprises) entrusted with the authority to make decisions on behalf of society.5 The extent 
to which this is a potential issue in any given country is reasonably well documented by the 
international community, based on perception or on studies of laws, processes and institutions by 
various watchdogs.  
The fact that the quantitative information is largely based on perception indicators is a problem in 
principle. Yet, perception indicators, often combined with high profile case studies, have motivated a 
lot of economic research which has, in turn, become an additional source of information. 
Economists, indeed, spend a lot of energy thinking and writing about corruption because the private 
interests gained from corruption are also a burden for the public interest (i.e. it imposes a deadweight 
loss on the economy). This defines an inefficient (and often unfair) allocation of resources, one the 
main focuses of modern economics. How to think and how to assess this burden/inefficiency based 
on information available has now become a research field in itself.  
This research has generated a large number of general results. For instance, a reasonably good first 
order approximation of the cost of distortions imposed on the economy can be provided by the 
excessive cost for the delivery of public sector commitments influenced by corrupt decisions. 
Similarly, the quantification of the waste of public resources on projects with high private rates of 
return but low social rates of return (e.g. the so-called “white elephants”) can easily be estimated from 
the difference between the private and the social return.  
These quantitative assessments often do not, however, cover all sources of social cost of corruption, 
which is a second limitation of the dependence on perception indicators. The main missing 
information is the recognition that corruption can also come from political bargaining power in a 
wide range of negotiations. In business, this bargaining power comes from an implicit market for 
favours in which business people and politicians are the main players. In politics, this implicit market 
involves only politicians and is built around the politically-motivated appointments to key positions 
within the administration and on the board of businesses in which the government is entitled to sit. 
Whether this is a problem or not in practice is quite hard to measure objectively. What we know from 
research is that the scope for private gains from public policies is larger when the public sector is 
larger. The larger the number of possible political appointments, the larger the potential market for 
favours and hence the risk of corruption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this could be a major issue 
in Belgium, as discussed below. 
These favours between civil servants, political appointees or elected politicians are classified as a 
crime by international watchdogs monitoring the quality of governance around the world, even if the 
legal texts do not always do so. The academic literature provides ample evidence of the extent to 
                                                                          
 
5 This is essentially also the definition adopted by Transparency International. “Corruption is 
operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” 
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which this market for favours can also impose a social cost on society, starting with the taxpayers.6  In 
many countries, including Belgium, the compliance with legal obligations to reveal payments to 
political appointees nominated on the board of public enterprises is rather low. This increases the 
difficulty of measuring some of the financial costs of the markets for favours, as well as their social 
costs. 
An additional concern with the proper measurement of the significance and cost of corruption is 
quite subtle but just as important. There are many instances of bad and costly public policy decisions. 
Research has also shown that these can be the result of incompetence or imperfections in the laws 
and policies, rather than the outcome of corruption. Indeed, incompetence, policy imperfections and 
corruption often have the same consequences for society.7  If incompetence can be linked to corrupt 
political appointment processes, there is, however, convergence on the governance root of the 
problem. Excessive road maintenance costs, excessive public debt, energy rationing or insufficient 
treatment of water pollution can just as easily be explained by: (ii) incomplete or confusing definitions 
of responsibilities/entitlements or incomplete allocation of responsibilities between various 
administrations, (ii) corrupt activities; or (iii) incompetent decisions made by public 
officials/politicians which could have been appointed through a corrupt governance structure—but 
not necessarily so.  The number of possible explanations for undesirable outcomes makes it easy for 
any corrupt individual to blame policy failures or even incompetence to avoid having to acknowledge 
corruption. Sorting out the various possible sources requires significant auditing resources. In 
practice, it means that corruption is usually underestimated, since the benefit of the doubt prevails in 
most legal systems and doubt is relatively easy to maintain under current legislation in many 
countries. 
A further measurement challenge stems from the fact that the main victims of corruption are quite 
silent, mostly because they are unaware of the costs and quite dispersed. The main victims are all the 
taxpayers and all the voters. The taxpayers are unaware victims when they pay more than they should 
to cover the excess fiscal costs due to corruption. Moreover, in many countries, the associated tax 
burden or the slower growth rate is passed on through debt to the next generations. These have no 
voice in current politics. Voters are also victims, in particular, when they have to live with service 
quantity and quality choices distorted by corruption. But most do not know how their costs and 
choices are linked to corruption. They only find out from media reports on specific cases, or from the 
publication of global corruption perception indicators. These are mostly based on investors’ surveys 
and only focus on some of the consequences of corruption. 
Measuring corruption is thus quite a serious challenge and this is why the efforts made by 
international and national agencies and watchdogs to generate relevant information are quite central 
to our collective ability to generate a local sense of the extent of corruption. It provides most of the 
evidence collected in this paper. But the review of the various sources of evidence also shows how 
                                                                          
 
6 E.g. see Rose-Ackerman and Soreide (2011) for a wide-ranging recent survey of academic research on 
the sources and consequences of corruption. 
7 See Estache and Foucart (2013) for a theoretical treatment.   
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differences of emphasis and focus across watchdogs can influence the perception of corruption in 
both absolute and relative terms (i.e. in comparison to other countries). Notwithstanding these 
differences, the various rankings help assess the different policy dimensions to be addressed. 
A final key limitation of this paper is that the stock-taking exercise reflects my biases as an economist 
and my limitations as a reader of academic research on the legal and political science approaches to 
corruption. This paper will nevertheless show that the significant overlap in concerns across the 
different disciplines leads to a significant amount of convergence on policy views. 
This paper is organized as a systematic diagnostic. It starts with an overview of the main data sources 
in section 2. How corruption is defined and tracked in Belgium is the focus of section 3. Section 4 
summarizes the evidence on the size of corruption in Belgium based on the information generated by 
international and national organizations and watchdogs. Section 5 discusses the main sources 
institutional and process issues characterizing the Belgian governance structure identified by 
independent observers as potential sources of corruption. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary 
of the policy suggestions made by these observers.  
 
2. Some background on data sources 
Although many corruption measures are available, they are all subjective perception measures. It 
would thus be unreasonable to argue that they are robust enough to generate a precise sense of the 
governance issues in any given country, including Belgium. If public administrations were to track 
illegal events on a systematic basis, perception indicators would have a lower relative importance in 
country diagnostics. But few countries, if any, and Belgium is no exception, generate the much 
needed exhaustive objective assessments of corruption and so the subjective perception indicators 
have to be the basis of the analysis for now. 8  
Perceptions indicators have been, and continue to be, a source of debates. These debates are not 
futile academic exercises since these indicators are used, in some countries, by international 
organizations to decide whether or not to lend based on the extent of the efforts to cut corruption as 
measured by some of these indicators. For now, the collective consensus seems to be that the 
indicators available are useful in spite of their limitations. Their usefulness in making relative and 
absolute performance benchmarking easy is particularly appreciated and actively used in policy 
communications and further justifies their use in the Belgian context.  
The indicators produced by international watchdogs can be organized in three groups. The first are 
the indicators released as part of global assessments of the economic performance of countries 
conducted every year by think tanks of varying degrees of ideological independence. They all release 
rankings of the key dimensions of the enabling environment of economic performance around the 
world, each with a specific spin on them, often reflecting their ideological biases, sometimes explicitly, 
                                                                          
 
8 The Nordic countries tend to do a better job than most on this front. 
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sometimes much less so. The most quoted reports include a survey-based assessment of trust in 
government or of the level of corruption at the country level or at the sector level within countries as 
expressed by the population or by investors. The best known reports among these global rankings are 
conducted by the World Economic Forum (with the Global Competitiveness Report covering 154 
countries), the World Bank (with the Doing Business Report which covers 189 countries, the Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal (with the Index of Economic Freedom covering 178 countries), 
and the United Nations (with the Human Development Report covering 195 countries). Similar 
rankings are conducted at the OECD or the European Union level with a narrower focus. Some 
countries such as the US, Brazil or India release their own assessments within countries and cover 
corruption as part of their assessments.   
The second group of international data sources is defined by a few annual reports focusing exclusively 
on the degree of corruption or on the quality of governance. The most widely used by researchers and 
policy analysts include the World Bank Governance Indicators (which cover 215 countries) and the 
Transparency International Indicators (which cover 175 countries). But there are many more and 
increasingly these other indicators focus on activities predictably sensitive to corruption risk such as 
procurement and other dimensions of interfaces.   A couple of Belgian watchdogs release equivalent 
reports, as will be discussed later.  
The third group of indicators is generated by industry lobbying groups (e.g. the construction or the 
banking industry) or by consulting firms (e.g. Ernst and Young, 2012), either autonomously or on 
behalf of a specific public or private client keen on documenting the extent to which corruption is or 
is not a problem. In recent years, all the major consulting firms have released such reports. Some 
include data on Belgium which will be used later to generate a snapshot of the corruption challenge 
the country is facing. All of these reports are useful, but the reader has to keep in mind that these are 
commercial reports, often financed by stakeholders who are not necessarily identified. This makes it 
hard to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.  
A look at the three groups of indicators reveals a certain degree of coherence in the approach to the 
identification of corruption. They focus largely on processes rather than on outcomes which would 
require adding up the number of documented cases. The assessment of processes is often anchored 
in consultations with the general public or with firms to assess the extent to which bribes are required 
to be able to get access to the desired service. The degree of specificity of the questions asked by the 
various surveys is what defines their difference. In general, however, the information generated by 
these surveys adds up to a largely coherent picture of some of the key sources of the problem and to a 
lesser extent on the size of the problem. It also helps identify the various policy areas that may need 
strengthening as we will see later with the Belgian case study. 
 
3. How Belgian law defines corruption 
Before getting to the summary of the quantitative information on the level, sources and impact of 
corruption in Belgium, it may be useful to summarize its legal treatment since this is what allows the 
formal identification of the problem and the discussion of its policy dimensions. The definition of 
corruption is spelled out in Article 216 of the Criminal Code. It is a general definition anchored in the 
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concept of bribe and it clearly states that bribing to corrupt decisions is a crime. The law recognizes 
that it takes two to tango and, to highlight that both the supply and the demand for corruption are 
seen as crime, the law distinguishes between active and passive bribery. Offering to bribe or asking for 
a bribe are both a crime in Belgium.9 The important question is thus what constitutes a bribe. 
For active public bribery, the Belgian law states that offering, promising or giving (directly or 
indirectly) an advantage of any kind to a person exercising a public function, either for him/herself or a 
third party, in order to induce him/her to: (i) perform an act within the scope of his/her responsibilities 
which is not subject to remuneration; (ii) perform an improper act, or refraining from a proper one, in 
the exercise of one’s function; (iii) commit an offence in the exercise of one’s function; or (iv) use 
influence derived from one’s function to obtain performance or non-performance of an act by a 
public authority, is criminal.  
Similarly, for passive public bribery, the Belgian law states that a person commits a crime when 
exercising a public function, if he/she requests or accepts directly or via another person an offer, 
promise or any advantage for him/herself or a third party, to act as described in (i) to (iv) above. The 
scope of the law is thus not restricted to cash payments; it also covers the market for favours discussed 
earlier. This is valid for both active and passive bribery.  
This definition thus seems quite encompassing. It is specific enough to allow a monitoring of violation 
of the law. Any action that can be defined as an active or passive bribe should be reasonably easy to 
record in some centralized database. Adding up the information and matching it against the various 
sources recorded by tribunals should provide a reasonable sense of the size and sources of corruption 
and, to a lesser extent, of the costs of corruption to society. 
The gap between the text of the law and practice is large, however, in Belgium. Even if the law could 
be used to set up a monitoring system, there is no systematic effort to collect this information in 
Belgium. There are (almost) no statistics on numbers, frequency, type and details of cases. Yet, there 
are many potential sources which generate relevant and potentially useful raw data to increase the 
transparency of the crime. These data are however not designed for statistical coherence and are thus 
hard to use in analytical work designed to assess the size and costs of corruption. These sources 
include: (i) the Central Office for the Repression of the Corruption (in French:  O.C.R.C.) 
established in 2001 as a part of the Directorate for Economic and Financial Crime (ECOFIN) of the 
Federal Judicial Police, and (ii) the audits of the Cour des Comptes (see the reports to the Parliament 
for a few well detailed assessments of information gaps in key public procurement markets). 
There are lots of anecdotal cases, however, many of which are covered by the media.10 For instance, a 
judge recently (in 2013) issued 71 indictments (47 individuals, 24 firms) for manipulation of public 
                                                                          
 
9 I am not a lawyer and I apologize for my very loose interpretation of the law which certainly does not 
do justify to key details. My goal is only to point the very general character of the law which can be used 
to cover a very wide range of suspect interactions if a judge decides to do so. 
10 Lambrecht et al. (2014) provide a useful inventory of cases widely covered over the last 25 years or so.  
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procurement from 1998 to 2008 at the Régie des Bâtiments. There are many more cases like these but 
simply adding up these anecdotes could not possibly be used as a reliable assessment of the extent of 
the problem in any country. Moreover, it would not say much about the size, frequency, impact, and 
incentive problems for instance.  
As if the measurement challenge was not big enough in itself, a number of political and constitutional 
characteristics of Belgium add to the complexity, as pointed out by Transparency International in its 
2012 National Integrity report (Transparency International, 2012). 11 Notwithstanding their differences, 
the two largest communities have a strong tradition of regulating the economy when markets fail, 
which is identified by the academic literature as a factor that increases the odds of corruption. 
Moreover, in both regions, there is a natural inclination for political interventionism in public and 
para-public institutions which also tends to influence the odds of corruption in an undesirable way.  
The political nature of the appointments to the boards of “inter-communales” (public service 
companies) or to the board of the Central Bank has recently enjoyed a high profile in the media when 
the government changed in 2014.12 But the problem is relevant to any public institution in Belgium: 
Appointments have to reflect a political and linguistic balance. This suggests a focus on politics rather 
than skills and a market for favours to be traded politically. Adding to the scope for foul play in the 
process is the often lax and opaque system of appointments, with no real public hearings as is tradition 
in many continental European countries.13 
The main point of this discussion is that the diversity of the country and the deep commitment to a 
central role for politics, rather than skills, in the management of a wide range of public services, are 
bound to limit the incentives for transparency and hence accountability for what the law defines as 
bribery. The recurring discussion on the failure of politicians to comply with the legal requirements on 
the transparency of their income sources (e.g. see the Cumuleo website, www.cumuleo.be) illustrates 
what these biases imply for the proper measurement of public sector governance failures in Belgium.  
 
4. A review of the perceived size of corruption in Belgium 
                                                                          
 
11 The exceptionally high degree of decentralization, the strong cultural and political differences 
between the North and the South of the country or the differences in the degree of religiosity are all 
drivers of corruption identified by the academic literature which define the heterogeneity  of Belgium.  
12 Intercommunales are public or semi-public enterprises responsible for the provision of key public 
services, e.g. utilities distribution or transport, to a number of neighbouring municipalities. The concept 
was initially designed to optimize scale economies in the provision of public services. They are usually 
run by a board staffed with active members of political parties in the majority of the municipalities 
enjoying the services of the enterprise.   
13 Taking an historical perspective, it could be argued that the art of negotiation and compromise has 
always been a matter of Darwinism in Belgium since its territory has been claimed by a wide range of 
countries over time. As history textbooks teach young Belgian students, Belgium has often been 
considered the battlefield of Europe.  
13 
 
 
This section is a synthesis of many pieces of partial information available from a wide range of sources. 
The idea is to try to build up a coherent snapshot from these different sources, recognizing that they 
take different perspectives. They include the theoretical background based on the extent a country 
with the institutional and historical characteristics of Belgium is more or less likely to be prone to 
specific levels and types of corruption. They also reflect sources influenced by actual or potential 
investors’ beliefs (e.g. the Doing Business Indicators generated by the World Bank as well as the 
partial surveys generated by commercial consulting firms such as Ernst and Young or McKinsey). In 
addition, they reflect how the perception indicators available for Belgium are influenced by the beliefs 
of common citizens (e.g. the EU sources). 
The first stage of this diagnostic will be a synthesis of the academic research on the lessons of 
international experience with corruption to get a sense of the level and type of corruption in Belgium. 
This research (e.g. Soreide (2012) or Treisman (2000) for relevant reviews) suggests that countries 
with: (i) strong internal cultural differences, (ii) strong decentralization built into their Constitution, 
(iii) strong religious traditions that discourage challenges to authority, (iv) legal decisions anchored 
into civil law rather than common law (i.e. with lawyers whose flexibility is constrained as drivers of the 
legal system, rather than with powerful judges), and (v) hierarchical enforcement rather than 
procedural tradition (i.e. with a strong tradition of reliance on the “raison d’Etat” as a legal argument 
to define the degree of enforcement), tend to be more tolerant of corruption than others. These 
elements alone suggest that tolerance for corruption should be higher in Belgium than in many other 
European countries.14  
The second step is to try to test these predictions from theory and assess the extent to which each 
theoretical prediction is reflected in common business practices in Belgium. It turns out that there is 
some sense that this tolerance exists. According to a 2012 Ernst and Young study, 42% of the 50 
Belgian-based firms who participated in the global survey considered that paying bribes is acceptable 
in times of crisis to get contracts (vs. 26% in global sample). Somewhat surprisingly, 34% admitted to 
have had paid bribes (vs. 11% in global sample). Even accounting for differences in sincerity across 
countries and the relatively small size of the Belgian sample, this is a powerful observation. 
The sense that there is a certain degree of tolerance for corruption is further validated by some of the 
questions asked by a Eurobarometer focusing on corruption (Eurobarometer, 2012). This survey, 
based on citizens’ perceptions, suggests that 71% of the population thinks corruption is a problem in 
Belgium at all levels of government, and about two thirds think it is part of the business culture. About 
half believe that it is a problem for public tenders and building permits, 40% for construction, food, 
health and sanitary inspectors and about a third see it as a problem to obtain business permits. 
These are not, however, that uncommon in similar sectors in other countries (although mostly in 
some of the least developed European countries and in many developing countries). What stands out 
in the survey is that it reveals that the main reason people think corruption is a problem in Belgium is 
                                                                          
 
14 The reader should keep in mind that this is about correlation, not necessarily causality between these 
characteristics and corruption levels and patterns. 
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that authorities are not trying hard enough to deal with it and, most importantly, that there is some 
degree of fatalism in the way the problem is treated.  This can be seen in the data reported in Table 1 
comparing Belgium to the average for the EU member countries. The most revealing data is the 
much larger-than-average sense that corruption is unavoidable (83% in Belgium vs 70% for the EU27 
agree with the assertion on the unavoidability of corruption). 
 
Table 1: Eurobarometer also reveals the reasons why people think corruption is a problem: 
 Not trying hard enough maybe and some degree of fatalism 
(% of the population agreeing with the assertion in the 1st column) 
 Belgium EU 27 
Government efforts to combat corruption are effective 29 22 
There are enough successful prosecutions 31 22 
There is sufficient transparency and supervision of the financing of political 
parties 
28 22 
Court punishment in corruption cases are too light 82 77 
EU helps in reducing corruption 30 22 
Corruption is unavoidable, it has always existed 83 70 
Corruption is often linked to organized crime 49 57 
Source: Eurobarometer (2012) 
 
The dark picture emerging from these surveys covering a wide range of dimensions of policy and 
institutional effectiveness (rather than just corruption) is, however, not entirely robust. It does not 
match the ranking held by Belgium in international surveys focusing on detailed dimensions of 
corruption. For instance, according to the 2014 Transparency International annual report, with a 
score of 76/100, Belgium ranks 15th out of 175 countries and 11th in Europe (Table 2). According to their 
2011 survey of bribes, Belgium ranked 3 out of 28 with a score of 8.7/10 and is thus seen as one of the 
countries least prone to bribes. It did however point to some concerns with the dimensions. Its 
compliance with the OECD anti-bribery convention is moderate but it ranks in the top 10% in terms 
of control of corruption. This has to be balanced with the observation that in 2012, Belgium only 
ranked 29 out of 142 countries in terms of judicial independence. 
Similar conclusions on the reasonable (if not stellar) Belgian performance can be reached from the 
2014 World Bank Governance indicators. Belgium ranks in the top 10% of the world for “Voice and 
Accountability”, “Government effectiveness” and “Control of corruption”. It only ranks in the top 15% 
for “Regulatory quality” and “Rule of law” and top 20% for “political stability.”  
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In absolute terms, this is indeed not a bad performance. In relative terms, when benchmarked against 
the rest of Europe, Belgium’s performance places it in the middle of the pack (at best) for Europe. 
There are 14 OECD countries doing better in the Transparency International survey, all of them with 
a much better score than Belgium.  
Considering all the information reported so far, a puzzle emerges. There is obviously a wide range of 
views on the size of corruption in Belgium. But at the same time there is a strong sense of 
convergence on the view that there is only a loose commitment to address a number of damaging 
processes. The most recurring themes include institutions that support the poor enforcement anti-
bribery laws and related international conventions and the tolerance for procurement practices that 
reduce the scope for political interference with the public interest.  
 
Table 2: How do European countries rank in terms of the Transparency 
International Anti-Corruption Index 
(100= the best; 0= the worst) 
World  Rank European rank Country 2014 Score 
1 1 Denmark 92 
3 2 Finland 89 
4 3 Sweden 87 
5 4 Norway 86 
5 4 Switzerland 86 
8 6 Netherlands 83 
9 7 Luxembourg 82 
12 8 Germany 79 
12 8 Iceland 79 
14 10 United Kingdom 78 
15 11 Belgium 76 
17 12 Ireland 74 
23 13 Austria 72 
26 14 France 69 
Source: Transparency International (2014) 
 
These concerns also have implications for the sustainability of the current management of the public 
sector. For instance, even if the link is seldom made in policy debates, the recent acceleration of the 
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public debt burden, combined with the slowdown in economic growth can also be related to weak 
governance, including corruption. Poor choices of public expenditure and the lasting tolerance for 
business tax loopholes are usually correlated with various sources of distortions from optimal decision-
making processes as recommended by public economics and public policy textbooks. Even if the 
relationship between poor practices and corruption simply reflects a random correlation, it seems 
reasonable to suspect causality. If the data were available, this could be tested. The data are however 
not available.  
The lack of data is not coincidental and is the result of the weak commitment to anti-corruption 
information generation and institutions, which is below OECD standards in Belgium. Some of this is 
consistent with corruption (e.g. political capture). Some is also consistent with limited competence 
due to poor institutional design. The two explanations are once again consistent with the predictions 
of incentive theory models of government; e.g. high cost and poor quality of public services can be the 
outcome of either corruption or limited government capacity (e.g. Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2011).  
These observations are not simply loose validations of academic theories. They are intended to serve 
as the starting point for a fair assessment of the consequences of poor public sector management, 
independently of their sources. Unless this is done, and unless sustainable long term solutions are 
identified, dynamic theory models all predict that the next generation of citizens is likely to pay the 
consequences of today’s poor management. This is seen in the evolution of the national debt in 
Belgium. Since the solutions to be adopted depend on the source of the problem, it is important to 
assess the extent to which the governance and institutional support to anti-corruption laws are lacking. 
The main purpose of the next section is to show the main sources of corruption in Belgium that have 
been identified and that should not be confused with incompetence.  
 
5. What are the potential sources of corruption according to watchdogs? 
One of the main “actionable” messages that emerge from the review so far is that there are 
information gaps. Without a reasonable amount of information, it is difficult to distinguish between 
incompetence, poor institutional or governance design and straightforward corruption. The next step 
of the “investigation” conducted in this paper is an assessment of the sources of information available 
to allow independent observers to distinguish between what is a crime versus a competence or 
institutional failure. 
Four documents are particularly relevant to identify some of the recurrent detailed legal and 
administrative weaknesses that are identified by watchdogs as issues that could facilitate corruption in 
Belgium: 
– The National Integrity Survey (NIS) of Belgium by Transparency International 
– The Right to Information Report published by produced by the Center for Law and Democracy 
in Canada and the NGO Access Info Europe 
– The GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption of the Counsel of Europe)’s 3rd evaluation 
report is quite useful with its focus on Criminal Law reform and on Political Party Financing 
– The EU procurement contracts database 
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They are all easily available to independent auditors and watchdogs. They all contain a large volume 
of information. In the three first cases, the information is straightforward and has been digested for the 
users. In the case of the EU procurement contracts database, the information is quite raw and raises 
some issues as discussed later but is sufficient to identify some key biases in the Belgian approach to 
procurement as revealed by those benefiting from EC support (i.e. those covered by that database). 
The picture emerging from the NIS may be the most precise in terms of the process and institutional 
issues that raise concern. This survey assesses the design of the national integrity system in terms of 
laws and institutions as well their effectiveness on the ground (i.e. how well they work). They cover 
political parties, parliaments, the judiciary, public administrations and the private sector in their role as 
promoters of integrity. They assess anti-corruption safeguards and their enforcement, including codes 
of conduct for parliamentarians, the mandatory disclosure of interests, assets and income, and 
restrictions on post-employment once members leave parliament. They also discuss the role of public 
watchdog institutions such as national public audit offices and ombudsman institutions as well as the 
media and civil society. Since these surveys are conducted for various countries, they can be used to 
compare and benchmark any given country. Just as important, they conclude with a set of reform 
options specific to each country. 
The survey published in 2012 points to a number of positive developments in Belgium, including 
significant efforts to increase transparency; even if it is still problematic in some key dimensions (e.g. 
only judges have access to some key details and the modest compliance by politicians and political 
nominees with respect to their financial disclosure obligations).15 It also points to a wide range of 
issues. Some of these include the size and skills of the staff involved in anti-corruption, which points to 
an inadequate level of training at parliamentary level, for instance. Staffing level, in particular, is an 
issue at the Justice department and the Central Office for the Fight against Corruption (OCRC).  
The report also documents some distortions in the financing of parties in favour of large parties. With 
respect to the legal framework, there is a large discrepancy between the legal texts and practice. The 
report finds the parliament and the executive to have only limited independence from party 
headquarters and to some extent from civil society organizations (e.g. unions) on key decisions.  The 
report also points out an occasional strong impact of media, public opinion and political interference 
on judiciary judgments. 
In addition, the survey points to a number of issues with respect to accountability.  There is a poor 
track record of control over parliamentary and executive performance outside of the election process. 
The report points to the absence of systematic audits of federal ministerial cabinets (strategic cells). It 
also points to the inefficiency of complaints and disciplinary procedures among politicians as well as 
civil servants. In addition, the report points to the fact that the federal level has not yet managed to 
create a functioning whistleblowing system. 
                                                                          
 
15 This is also a point made and documented by the NGO Cumuleo (see.  http://www.cumuleo.be/) 
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Finally, the report finds that the level of integrity achieved is insufficient whether in parliament, in the 
executive, or, to a lesser extent, in the judiciary. This includes the absence of an ethical code of 
conduct for members of parliament and quite incomplete rules on gifts or conflicts of interests.16 
Compliance is also an issue. Across the board, there seems to be problems with control and 
disciplinary procedures. The much better situation in the public sector and law enforcement agencies 
is given as an example, at least in terms of formal arrangements (e.g. the ethical code of conduct). It 
also still suffers from insufficient implementation however, according to Transparency International 
(2012).  
The Right to Information ranking focuses on the generation and access to information.17 lt validates 
the TI report. The extent to which information is transparent and easily accessible to potential 
watchdogs or NGOs for instance is considered quite poor in Belgium, not only in absolute terms but 
also in relative terms. In this international ranking, Belgium is in the bottom 10 (94th in the sample 
covered by the survey) on this dimension. It is worth noting, however, that only 23 countries perform 
reasonably well. This is hardly a consolation for Belgium in view of its relatively low ranking.  
The final recurring source of process-oriented information on corruption sources on which to focus 
policies is the recurring monitoring conducted by the Council of Europe Anti-Corruption Group 
(GRECO). The GRECO was created in 1999 to improve the capacity of member states to fight 
corruption. It includes 45 countries and releases regular country assessments. In the 2014 report, the 
GRECO points to the need to continue to improve preventive measures within parliamentary and 
judicial institutions. It welcomes the recent establishment of codes of conduct and a Federal Ethics 
Committee, as well as the introduction of preventive measures for federal parliamentarians, which 
include a system for the declaration of donations, official appointments, other positions held and 
assets.  
The report also expresses some concerns. It regrets the complexity of the ethics codes, the lack of a 
regulatory system and of a clear commitment to enforce the code, notably concerning gifts and other 
benefits as well as the poor publicity of information on income and assets for members of the 
Parliament.  It also regrets the lack of rules with respect to relations with interested third parties (e.g. 
lobbies). The Belgian justice system can be seen as independent and decentralised, but it is poorly 
financed and understaffed. Moreover, the monitoring of its performance is weak. The GRECO, 
finally, points to the need to finalise the organisation of the system of administrative justice, in 
particular to ensure the integrity of the staff, as is the case in other courts. 
A last source of information that can help shape the snapshot of the corruption challenge in Belgium 
is the country-specific information revealed by the EU procurement contract database. Maybe the 
most interesting information that can be derived from this dataset is that Belgium has a strong 
preference for contracts which favour subjectivity over objectivity in the identification of the winners. 
In its 2013 annual report, the Belgian National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) suggests that it 
                                                                          
 
16 The recent introduction of an ethical code has addressed this issue. 
17 The country report is available at  http://www.rti-rating.org/view_country.php?country_name=Belgium 
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would be desirable for Belgium to try to get similar statistics for all contracts awarded by public 
institutions and not just those involving the EU.  
With so many lenses used to define the levels and sources of corruption and to assess the possibility 
that the problem is incompetence or poor policy design instead of corruption, it is difficult to be 
strongly assertive on the assessment of the many drivers of the Belgian situation. The Global 
Competitiveness ranking may be the closest to achieve that complete picture.  Table 3 summarizes 
the ranking on the questions that come closest to the issues raised by the various studies reviewed so 
far.  
Table 3 confirms the mixed impression left by the review of the partial evidence collected from 
various sources. Overall, Belgium is not doing badly when compared to the rest of the world (it is 
18th), but it is not doing great when compared to OECD countries. In spite of that performance, it is 
hard not to be puzzled by the difficulty of reconciling this ranking with many of the other perceptions, 
including the fact that transparency is lacking (56th). How can anyone argue that there is no problem, 
if transparency is lacking? 
On balance, what emerges from this specific and more encompassing ranking is that incompetence 
in the public sector and poor policy are as likely as corruption to be a costly problem in Belgium. As 
mentioned earlier, all three forms of distortion lead to similar degrees of government ineffectiveness. 
The harsh evidence is that it is a lot more costly than appreciated. The connection between these 
weaknesses and the evolution of public debt is seldom made. But as recently shown by Grechyna 
(2012) for high income countries and Cooray and Schneider (2013) for a sample of 106 countries, they 
are related. So blaming the crisis for the increase in the debt/GDP ratio is too easy a way out to be 
credible to public finance specialists. 
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Table 3: How did Belgium rank according to the World Competitiveness Report 2014 
 on corruption-related issues (out of 144 countries) 
Global competitiveness index 18 
Diversion of public funds 16 
Judicial Independence 18 
Irregular payments and bribes 19 
Reliability of police services 23 
Public trust in politicians 23 
Favouritism in decision of government officials 24 
Public institutions quality 25 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards 30 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 42 
Government efficiency 53 
Transparency of government policymaking 56 
Wastefulness of government spending 59 
Government procurement of advanced tech products 63 
Burden of government regulation 130 
Source: World Competitiveness Report 2014-15 
At most, 20 points of the over 100% debt to GDP ratio can be blamed on the crisis. The rest is still very 
high and is the best proxy available to measure the long term impact of the combination of 
corruption, incompetence and poor policy design. Grechyna’s model, which allows a test of how well 
corruption perception indicators can help, predicts quite well the stock of debt in most countries and 
provides useful insights for Belgium. It shows that corruption perception indicators clearly contribute 
to drive the debt to GDP ratio but there has to be something else to explain this debt level. This could 
be incompetence or bad policy design. But she also suggests that the problem may be that the level of 
debt is not consistent with the low levels of perceived corruption but is coherent with a much higher 
level of actual corruption. She also adds that accounting for political instability improves the 
prediction of the model for Belgium. Belgium is clearly not a simple case study, but these sorts of 
results beg for a more in depth explanation for the high level of debt. It is unlikely to be random and it 
is unlikely that most of it can be blamed on the crisis. 
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The main point, however, is that future generations of Belgians will suffer from the numerous sources 
of institutional weaknesses (some by design, some by inertia) that leave room for unaccountable 
conflicts of interests in the use of public resources.  
 
6. Some policy-oriented concluding comments 
It would be absurd to claim to be able to design an anti-corruption agenda from this survey. There is a 
lot of information missing either because it is not accessible to the public or simply because it is not 
being collected. But there is enough food for thought flowing from the sum of these partial 
explanations to point to a few policy areas that deserve the attention of politicians and civil society. 
The main sources of institutional weakness are indeed identified quite explicitly in the various surveys 
and can be turned into a synthetic list of the main areas on which policy should focus. This list should 
include fixing a few areas recurrently identified as troublesome:  
• Biases favouring non-competitive and non-transparent procurement processes 
– This is illustrated by the fact that negotiations are too often preferred over auctions for the 
award of public procurement contracts, without any obvious reason.  
– Reassessing the choice of auction design for public sector contracts to favour their 
transparency, the minimization of fiscal costs and the accountability of poor service  
providers is possible and should be the subject to a special task force or commission. 
• Biases favouring discretion vs rule in many policy dimensions  
– This is illustrated by the poor perception shared by many rankings with respect to contract 
enforcement. Increasing transparency on votes at the parliament by increasing access to 
the information and increasing access to the justification  
– This is needed to be able to understand the extent to which quantitative information is used 
to anchor decisions rather than subjective political instinct and is part of what international 
experience suggests makes sense to improve the fairness and the accountability of 
democratic processes  
• Biases in top civil servant appointments 
– This is illustrated by the composition of the boards of most public enterprises or enterprises 
in which the government is a key shareholder in which political affiliation is more relevant 
than skills. 
– The kind of information generated by the NGO Cumuleo is a strong step in the right 
direction simply because it increased the transparency of the strong political representation 
on the board of key agencies but it would seem to make sense to do it more systematically 
across every agency and to use it to improve the benchmarking of performance of these 
nominees and use it to improve accountability for poor performance in the same way poor 
performance is used for accountability in private boards. 
• Biases against measurement 
– This is illustrated by the difficulty of getting access to enough financial data on key public 
sector activities (including procurement not involving the EC)) and on the salaries and 
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assets of public office holders as well as coordinated and public data on convictions for 
corruption (except for the few useful studies conducted by the Government Auditing 
Office (Cour des Comptes). In the context of public procurement for instance, a simple 
ex-ante diagnostic could be conducted to assess the extent to which processes can easily be 
manipulated to generate a desired winner by spelling out incomplete, imprecise or 
incoherent rules. In addition, it would be quite easy to track non-compliance, lack of 
sanctions or lack of accountability (i.e. cheaters can be allowed to bid again in future 
contracts). 
– Increased transparency on all types of costs is not only useful to identify suspicious outliers 
which could be linked to inadequate or illegal processes but they are also necessary to be 
able to get a sense of the extent to which there is margin to reduce fiscal expenditures 
without reducing the quality or the quantity of service 
• Biases against accountability  
– This is not only illustrated by the data gaps just mentioned but also by fact the judicial 
system is underfunded which limits the scope for taking corrupt actors to court. 
– Anti-corruption laws are like any other law: unless they can be enforced they are largely 
useless. In the Belgian context, the survey suggests also that a fair assessment by a judge 
(supported by experts on the matter being analysed) of the extent to which corruption can 
be distinguished from incompetence or wrong policy decisions is likely to be an important 
contributor to the improvement in the accountability for overall management of the public 
sector in the interest of taxpayers and of public service beneficiaries. For a country with 
such a high debt level that cannot afford to cut many expenditures and does not have a 
significant margin to increase tax revenue, increasing accountability is essential to ensure 
the improvement in the quality (i.e. efficiency) and the composition of public expenditure 
(i.e. the extent to which expenditure decisions are made to support both growth and social 
goals at the lowest possible fiscal cost) and of taxes. These improvements are likely to be 
major drivers of the return to a robust and fairly shared growth and this survey should have 
made it clear that there is a link between the quality of the public sector and the 
macroeconomic and social prospects.  
For those interested in studying corruption, there is not much novelty in this list. Tracking the 
evolution of the performance indicators over long periods of time suggests that very little progress has 
been made in the last 10 to 15 years according to most evaluations and rankings. This is in spite of the 
potential fiscal cost savings that could significantly contribute to cut the debt burden as seen in the 
international experiences (e.g. see Rose-Ackerman and Soreide (2011), for various surveys). 
Specific suggestions to address each of these problems have already been made by international and 
national legal teams looking at Belgium. For the interested reader, a good place to start is the solutions 
identified by Transparency International (2012) in its Belgian case assessment as well as the most 
recent documents released by the GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption of the Council of 
Europe), with a focus on Criminal Law reform and on Political Party Financing.  
Many of the solutions will work whether the problem is corruption, incompetence or policy mis-
management. They should reduce the number of conflicts of interest, allow skills to prevail over 
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politics, and increase accountability in front of judges for those cases in which corruption is the source 
of the high costs or the wrong choices rather than the other two potential sources. Lower costs will 
eventually also allow tax cuts. How fast and how much can be achieved is hard to estimate precisely 
because perception indicators are useful but not a substitute for objective information on corruption 
and its sources.     
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The note by Antonio Estache offers a very thorough overview of what we know and don’t know about 
corruption in Belgium. He brings together data from many different sources, while carefully 
emphasizing the still significant limitations of using these data to understand prevalence of corruption 
in Belgium. The result of this exercise is a very interesting analysis that also includes a very clear 
normative position. Particularly notable is his repeated reference to the negative impact of corruption 
on national debt and, in turn, on future generations. He is also careful to point out that corruption is 
not the only antecedent of poor performance. Factors like incompetence and poor design might lead 
to the same outcome.  
Having the luxury to be able to continue upon such an extensive overview and analysis, my 
commentary will be limited. I will address four issues. First, I will complement Estache’s review of 
data on the prevalence of corruption in Belgium with a few additional reflections. Then, I will discuss 
some factors that are said to increase the risk for corruption in Belgium. This will be followed by a 
brief exploration of some aspects of anti-corruption policy that might help to prevent corruption. 
Those reflections on risk and preventive factors will be complementary to Estache’s discussion as it 
will mainly draw from political science and public administration, while Estache mainly focused on 
arguments from economics. I will conclude with a caveat about the unintended consequences of 
anti-corruption policies.  
1. Prevalence	  of	  corruption	  in	  Belgium:	  some	  reflections	  on	  measurement	  
As already mentioned, Estache presents an extensive and critical overview of different types of 
indicators offered by various organizations such as the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, 
Transparency International as well as consulting firms and lobbying groups. Importantly, he also 
offers an extensive discussion of the limitations of these indicators. I would complement that 
discussion with two additional considerations.  
The first consideration concerns the use of general indicators that are supposed to describe the 
(perceived) prevalence of corruption or bribery in one summative figure or ranking. Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index is probably one of the best known such indicators. The 
idea that a very complex phenomenon with many different dimensions and manifestations in many 
different areas of public life could be summarized into one general figure is highly disputable. Such 
indicators are so crude that they are very poor indicators to evaluate policies. Yet, in spite of these 
obvious flaws, these general indicators are still used to support important decisions. If it is still true that, 
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as Estache (p. 9) describes, international organizations use these indicators as a basis for decisions 
about lending to countries, then I think that practice should be cause for major concern. Both 
international organizations and the countries they intend to help would benefit greatly from looking 
into alternative ways of evaluating anti-corruption policies. Recent developments in corruption 
research from a political science perspective might be useful in this respect (see e.g. Johnston’s work, 
as discussed below).  
The second consideration concerns the widespread use of citizens’ surveys to measure the indicator 
‘perceived corruption’. As Estache points out (p. 6), because these are merely perception indicators, 
they should not be used as proxy for actual corruption. Yet, even as an indicator of perceived 
prevalence of corruption, they are debatable. There are good reasons to consider citizens’ response to 
general questions about how much corruption they perceive as indicators of a deeper attitude, rather 
than as perceptions of actual behavior. For example, Van de Walle (2005), looking at data from 
Belgium, found that high degrees of perceived corruption coincide with high degrees of alienation. 
Instead of adopting the common belief that the former is the cause of the latter, he argues that it is the 
other way round. When asked in very general questions about the perceptions of corruption, citizens 
tap from their general attitudes about the political system in their country, rather than from their 
actual knowledge about actual behaviors. Whether this interpretation is correct will require further 
research, but the argument is plausible enough to at least be cautious in simply assuming that citizens’ 
answer to a general question about perceived prevalence indeed represents perceptions of that 
prevalence.  
Together with some of the critical reflections by Estache, these considerations suggest that in order to 
fully answer the question about prevalence of corruption in Belgium and elsewhere, further work on 
the development of measurement instruments will be necessary. I briefly list some suggestions. 
As for quantitative research, it will be important to move away from very general crude indicators 
and instead look at much more specific indicators focusing on particular types of behavior by 
particular actors in specific sectors or even organizations. To the extent that these indicators rely on 
survey research, they will have to use very specific items asking about actual experiences and 
behavior, thus moving away from general perception questions. Asking for specific types of behavior 
in survey questions is of course very vulnerable to problems of social desirability bias and hence 
underreporting, but innovations in (web-)survey research might help to reduce that risk. Another 
useful alternative quantitative indicator would be police and judicial statistics. Estache discusses a 
number of those figures for Belgium, also pointing at the limitations. Perhaps it is useful to add to the 
limitations of all police and judicial statistics (e.g. dark number, registration bias), a problem specific to 
corruption. Corruption is often associated with other offences that are easier to prove and that 
generate more serious penalties. Hence, both police and the judiciary tend to focus on those other 
offences, thus inadvertently contributing to an underreporting of corruption in the statistics. 
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Perhaps more importantly, it will also be important to move beyond mere quantitative observations 
towards more qualitative research. In his influential book on ‘syndromes of corruption’ (2005) 
political scientist Michael Johnston offers, in addition to some quantitative analyses, a qualitative 
analysis of “the underlying developmental processes, and problems, of which a society’s corruption is 
symptomatic” (p. 38). Instead of saying how ‘high’ or ‘low’ corruption is, he focuses on the nature of 
corruption in a particular country and on the underlying mechanisms. Arguably, that qualitative kind 
of information will offer a much more nuanced and realistic understanding of the state of corruption 
in a country than mere crude quantitative indicators. More importantly, it will help to offer more 
useful and specific advice. When the problem is described by means of general, crude indicators, the 
solutions offered are often of the equally general sort, typically in the form of universal recipes (e.g. 
establish an anti-corruption agency, increase transparency, and strengthen competition). When, 
instead, a more qualitative approach is used to develop a nuanced diagnosis of the syndrome, this will 
almost naturally lead to suggestions that are much more specific for that particular syndrome. 
Specifically, Johnston proposes four such syndromes of corruption, suggesting that in most countries 
typically one syndrome is dominant. He illustrated each of the syndromes with three country studies, 
and offers suggestions for different anti-corruption strategies for each of those syndromes. The four 
syndromes are ‘influence markets’ (US, Germany, Japan), ‘elite cartels’ (Italy, South Korea, 
Botswana) ‘oligarchs and clans’ (Russia, Philippines, Mexico) and ‘official moguls’ (China, Kenya, 
Indonesia). Unfortunately, Belgium is not presented as a qualitative case study.18  
2. Risk	  factors	  for	  corruption	  in	  Belgium	  
Complementary to Estache’s analysis of factors that increase the risk of corruption in Belgium, this 
section briefly discusses some risk factors often mentioned in the political science literature. The 
overview draws from De Winter (2003), Maesschalck and Van de Walle (2006), Peters (2006) and a 
chapter in the 2012 NIS-report (Maesschalck, 2012). The factors are organized in four categories.  
First, many authors refer to a complex of interconnected cultural factors such as the relatively small 
trust in government, a relatively high tolerance for rule transgressions and a broader culture of 
clientelistic relations between politicians and their voters. These factors are said to create a context 
                                                                          
 
18 However, in addition to the qualitative case studies Johnston (2005) also attempts to cluster a much 
larger number of countries in the four categories using cluster analysis on the basis of quantitative data. 
That analysis leaves Belgium, somewhat intriguingly, in the ‘elite cartels’ category, not in the ‘influence 
markets’ category. This allocation is surprising. A quick qualitative assessment suggests that many 
characteristics of the ‘influence markets’ syndrome are applicable to Belgium, while many ‘elite cartels’ 
characteristics are not. Situating Belgium in Johnston’s typology requires thorough qualitative research, 
but my quick assessment would be that Belgium is rather a hybrid of ‘influence markets’ and ‘elite 
cartels’ than an instance of the latter.  
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that facilitates corrupt behavior. Yet, there are some reasons to believe that this culture is slowly 
changing, as some illustrations in the 2012 NIS-report suggest. 
Second, political parties, and particularly their leadership, play a central role in the Belgian political 
system, which has been described as a ‘particracy’. Traditionally, political parties had an important 
impact upon the careers of public servants and magistrates, because of their role in appointments. 
More recently, this impact has diminished as a consequence of reforms both in the administration 
(Stinckens & Maesschalck, 2012) and the judiciary (Janssens & Vander Beken, 2012). Yet, political 
party leadership’s impact upon members of the legislature and the government remains very strong. 
This concentration of power, combined with the drastically growing demand for party funding is 
often blamed for the political corruption scandals in the 1990’s (often about cases that actually took 
place in 1980’s). Party financing in Belgium is much better organized now than it was in the 1980s, but 
there certainly still remain reasons for concern about the current party funding system (Debacker, 
Maesschalck & Roosen 2012). 
A third category of factors has to do with the dominance of the government in political decision 
making and particularly with the role of the ministerial cabinets. De Winter (2003, p. 99) writes: “as 
they are central to departmental decision-making and are staffed by party loyalists, ministerial 
cabinets are evidently useful sites for organizing illicit activities”. Several efforts were made to reduce 
both size and impact of these cabinets, but to only very limited effect. The fact that genuine integrity 
management within these cabinets is very weak adds to these concerns.  
The fourth category concerns a number of specific characteristics of the Belgian political system that 
is often described as ‘consociationalist’ in the well-known typology of Lijphart (Frognier, 1986; 
Lijphart, 1999). The strong ties between a political party and many other organizations from the same 
‘pillar’ on the hand and the culture of closed decision making between the members of the elite of 
those pillars on the other hand are often mentioned as relevant factors. They might perhaps not lead 
directly to corruption, but they certainly lead to opaque decision making. Peters (2006) argues that 
this lack of transparency has a certain degree of functionality in a complex country like Belgium and 
even talks about ‘functional corruption’.  
Some of the factors mentioned here, were also mentioned by Estache, but perhaps it is useful to also 
point at some differences between Estache’s approach that mainly draws from economics and a 
political science perspective.  
Estache (p. 7), for example, hypothesizes a strong link between the size of the public sector and 
corruption: “What we know from research is that the scope for private gains from public policies is 
larger when the public sector is larger.” Many political scientists would question this hypothesis, 
referring to countries with relatively large public sectors and still low indicators of perceived 
corruption (e.g. Germany or the Scandinavian countries). Political science and public administration 
would suggest a host of other factors, such as the ones mentioned above, that are much more relevant 
in explaining corruption than mere size. 
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Likewise, Estache seems to have great trust in a technocratic, a-political style of policy making. For 
example, he denounces “distortions from optimal decision-making processes as recommended by 
public economics and public policy textbooks” (p. 15), somewhat implying that decision making 
should be driven by handbooks, rather than by political considerations. He is also critical of ‘biases 
favouring discretion’ (p. 20), arguing that decisions based on ‘quantitative information’ might be better 
at improving the fairness and the accountability of democratic processes’ than ‘subjective political 
instinct’ (p. 20). From a political science perspective, this would be debatable. Of course, in many 
cases public policy decisions would benefit from better information. Yet, certainly not everything that 
is important can be measured quantitatively, so qualitative information might be at least as important. 
Moreover, political scientists would emphasize that many policy issues are essentially contested and 
that a, sometimes messy, democratic decision making process is necessary to reach a legitimate 
decision. In such a process, political instinct might be at least as important in coming to decisions as 
quantitative indicators and recipes offered by textbooks. In fact, Johnston (2014) proposes ‘deep 
democratization’ as the central path to corruption prevention. Corruption will continue, he argues, 
“until those with a stake in ending it are able to oppose it in ways that cannot be ignored” (Johnston, 
2014, p. 240). In this democratic process, quantitative and other technocratic information can, to 
some extent, empower citizens, but only when they are used in a genuinely political discourse, not 
merely in a technocratic discourse.  
3. Anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  in	  Belgium	  
Estache lists a number of anti-corruption efforts in Belgium. In this section, I briefly add a few 
observations, particularly focusing on the public sector. This discussion draws from the discussion of 
the weaknesses mentioned in the conclusion of the 2012 NIS-report on Belgium and focuses on the 
Belgian federal administration. 
First, some functions that are often considered as protective for corruption simply do not exist in the 
Belgian system. The most obvious example of this is the absence of administrative investigative 
capacity at the federal level. When the Hoog Comité van Toezicht was abolished, its judicial 
investigations were adopted by the police, but no actor adopted the responsibility for administrative 
investigations at federal level. The example at the level of the Flemish administration (where 
administrative investigations are the responsibility of the agency ‘Audit Vlaanderen’) shows that it is 
both necessary and feasible to have such an actor, complementary to the judicial investigations done 
by the police. This re-introduction of administrative investigative capacity at federal level would be a 
major improvement. 
Second, some functions are present, but not properly developed. For example, there have been some 
serious efforts to develop and communicate a ‘conflict of interest’ policy at federal level, but 
awareness among public servants is still limited. Particularly given the Belgian tradition of clientelism, 
this deserves more efforts. One often mentioned instrument to manage conflicts of interest is the 
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mandatory disclosure of mandates, income and assets for senior politicians and public servants. 
Belgium has such an instrument, but it has important flaws, as Estache also points out (see below).  
Third, some instruments are formally developed, but do not function as they ideally should. A case in 
point are disciplinary procedures in the administration, the police and magistracy. The existing 
disciplinary procedures are often complicated and tedious. This not only increases the risk for 
procedural mistakes, but also renders the instrument less effective then it could be.  
Finally, Belgian anti-corruption policy lacks overall coordination and vision. There are significant 
efforts by the many different actors involved, but these are not really coordinated in an overall anti-
corruption strategy. This is, partly, because political interest has been limited, but there are some 
indications that this is changing.  
4. In	  conclusion:	  the	  limitations	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies	  
However important anti-corruption policies are, policy makers and researchers also have a duty to 
remain aware of their opportunity costs and their limitations.  
Anti-corruption policies of course have a cost of their own. In many cases those costs are worth 
paying, but it is the responsibility of anti-corruption activists and policy makers to continuously 
question the efficiency of anti-corruption measures. For example, while the reporting by senior 
politicians and public servants of their assets and mandates might be an important means to increase 
transparency, it can also quickly become a very costly and time-consuming bureaucratic operation. It 
will be important to continue monitoring the cost-benefit balance and to consider alternative 
measures that might reach the same goal at less cost. Moreover, however important corruption-
prevention and -fighting are, policy makers of course also have many other worthy goals to achieve. 
Anti-corruption interventions should not only be balanced against anti-corruption policy alternatives, 
but also against policy alternatives aimed at achieving those other goals.  
In addition to those obvious considerations about the opportunity costs, it is also useful to refer to a 
number of possible undesirable and unintended consequences of anti-corruption policies. It will be 
important for both researchers and policy makers to consciously address and thus attempt to avoid 
these. Even if one agrees that all forms of corruption are bad, that certainly does not imply that all 
anti-corruption efforts are inherently good. In all their enthusiasm, anti-corruption activists might 
forget this obvious truth. In doing so, they run the risk of seriously harming anti-corruption efforts, as 
the undesirable consequences might undermine the legitimation of the anti-corruption policies as a 
whole. Two examples of undesirable and unintended consequences of particular types of anti-
corruption policies within the public sector can illustrate this.  
First, if an anti-corruption policy emphasizes strict rules and procedures, this implies a number of 
risks. The accumulation of procedures and rules could lead to ‘goal displacement’ (Merton, 1957) 
where the rule is no longer a means to an end but an end in itself, while the original goal of the rule is 
forgotten. A case in point would be a rule that limits the gifts a public servant might accept to a certain 
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amount, e.g. 25 euros. It is not unlikely that discussions would quickly be about the pecuniary value of 
a particular gift, rather than about the actual aim of this rule: avoiding (the appearance of) partiality. 
An accumulation of rules and procedures could also lead to very tedious and long decision making 
procedures. This could, in turn and ironically, increase the temptation among citizens to bribe 
officials to speed up the process.  
Second, many anti-corruption policies emphasize transparency. While there are many good reasons 
for transparency, it also implies some risks. Some decision making, particularly in the preparatory 
phase and in a complicated political environment like Belgium’s, could benefit from a certain degree 
of confidentiality. If this is made more difficult by transparency rules, then this might push decision 
makers to even more informal and backroom decision making, which might in turn invite more 
intrusive and costly transparency regulations.  
In addition to the unintended consequences associated with specific anti-corruption measures, anti-
corruption policies as a whole also generate such consequences. Again, two examples can illustrate 
this. 
First, most anti-corruption interventions have some public visibility, often because policy makers like 
to advertise their, but also because some anti-corruption interventions actively involves citizens, as 
anti-corruption activists like Transparency International advocate. While there are many good 
reasons to inform and involve citizens, this also carries a significant risk. By emphasizing the risks for 
corruption, policy makers and anti-corruption advocates might inadvertently create a perception that 
there is a serious problem of corruption, even when in reality that is not the case. The result of this 
might be that, while anti-corruption policies usually intend to increase citizens’ trust in government, 
they instead unnecessarily undermine the public’s trust (Bovens, 2006). Personally, I do not think we 
have reached that point in Belgium yet, but it is a risk to be taken into consideration.  
Second, it is useful to be aware that investment in anti-corruption policies almost inevitably implies 
the creation of anti-corruption actors, i.e. an anti-corruption ‘industry’ (Huberts, 2014, p. 9), with a 
stake in maintaining and strengthening anti-corruption policies. These actors have an interest in 
identifying as much corruption problems as possible and subsequently offering instruments and 
models to solve those problems. While they might not consciously exaggerate the problem, there 
certainly is a risk for them to be biased in that direction. If their observations are then made public, the 
result will be: ‘doing better feeling worse’ (Bovens, 2006, p. 70). This might weaken public trust (see 
above), in turn justifying further expansion of the anti-corruption efforts, etc. Again, I personally do 
not think Belgium has yet gone that path, but it is a risk  we should remain aware of. 
So, how should we now move forward? Arguably, any policy alternative carries with it risks for 
unintended consequences, so believing in risk-free anti-corruption instruments and then aggressively 
advocating them is not a very fruitful way forward. Nor should we be paralyzed by the awareness of 
these risks.  
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Instead, we should continuously analyze Belgian anti-corruption policies and identify measures that 
deserve to be introduced or strengthened in Belgium (see above). At the same time, however, we 
should be systematically aware of the potential risks of each of these measures and design policies in 
such a way so as to reduce those risks. One obvious way to do so is by ensuring a sufficiently broad mix 
of policy instruments that could each compensate for each other’s weaknesses and risks. The 
literature on organizational ethics offers typologies that could help conceptualizing such a mix (e.g. 
Maesschalck, 2005).  
In addition to that, it would also be important to maintain a broad perspective and to remain aware 
that corruption is merely a symptom. A narrow focus on fighting corruption alone will not be 
sufficient. While part of the answer is indeed to alleviate the symptom and to address the underlying 
disease, the other part is to improve society’s resistance and general well-being so as to prevent the 
symptom from returning. This requires a much more forward-looking and optimistic perspective than 
that of merely fighting corruption. Johnston’s (2014) ‘deep democratization’ as well as the growing 
literature on quality of government (e.g. Rothstein, 2011) offer such perspectives. As for the 
organizational level, the growing literature on ethics management suggests to complement the 
necessary but insufficient ‘compliance’ or ‘rule-based’ efforts with more positive, ‘integrity’ or ‘values-
based’ efforts. The latter are aimed at supporting and coaching staff in dealing with ethical dilemmas, 
rather than merely controlling them. Given that Belgium has some corruption problems but is not 
overwhelmed by them and given that it has seen some important anti-corruption efforts but not to an 
excessive extent, it would be an excellent testing ground for such balanced approaches combining 
tough corruption fighting with more positive long-term resistance building efforts.  
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1. An unavoidable subject matter 
It is Re-bel’s ambition to stimulate a debate around the re-thinking of the Belgian institutions. Clearly, 
the fight against corruption has to find a place of choice in this context. Corruption, however one 
wants to define it, undermines political institutions and brings confusion to the understanding of the 
power relations in the political and economic community. Governance structures in either the public 
or the private sector are destabilized by corruptive practices, as these create parallel loyalties, conflicts 
of interest and non-transparent belongings. Re-thinking a new Belgium cannot shy away from also re-
thinking legal and ethical attitudes and behavior towards corruption. 
 
2. And still, there is this denial… 
Awareness about the dangers of and the damage from corruption has become common good almost 
everywhere in the world with only a few countries still noted as laggards in this context, such as, most 
surprisingly, Belgium. It is remarkable that e.g. in the Peoples’ Republic of China, a one-party regime, 
the combat against corruption has taken incredible proportions, while our country is lukewarm about 
fighting corruption. 
In our country, even after experiencing the trauma of the Agusta Dassault case – which, by the way, 
was efficiently handled by the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) - one still meets with 
people who tend to sweeten the pill: “Do we really have a serious problem of corruption in Belgium?” 
Belgium hardly comes out of a lingering state of denial. 
 
3. What is the present state of play in Belgium? 
In fact, there may be some reasons for some of our fellow countrymen to still indulge in such an 
illusion. When Antonio Estache aptly reviews in his ground breaking analysis the available indicators 
about the extent and pervasiveness of the corruption phenomenon in Belgium, he i.a. refers to the 
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which grants Belgium a 
remarkable 15th place in a world ranking (and an 11th place in an European ranking) of the countries 
reviewed. And Antonio also mentions the same NGO’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI), where Belgium is 
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ranked - even more remarkably- 3rd out of 28 exporting countries. The (inadvertent) reader of such 
indicators could take home the impression that Belgium belongs to Europe’s, if not the world’s, 
integrity champions.   
 
Is this to say that – apart from a few nitpickers like me – there is a consensus about the fact that 
Belgium is an island of integrity in a sea of corruption? Would our fellow countrymen be right when 
they question the need for large reform of our business and administrative practices? Is corruption 
only a minor issue that shouldn’t prevent anybody from sleeping peacefully at night? 
 
4. A few missing indicators 
In his article, Antonio extensively refers to the GRECO review mechanism reports, in which 
GRECO, the Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption, conducts examinations of the way the countries 
signatory of the Council of Europe anti-corruption instruments implement the latter. The GRECO 
reviews are thorough and are relatively favorable in their conclusions of our country.  
One should, however, in order to have a full picture, also include in one’s analysis the reviews 
performed by another top quality specialized body, the Working Group on Corruption of the 
OECD. In the latter’s reviews on the way Belgium conducts its anti-corruption policies, one can read 
quite a more critical view on the situation prevailing in Belgium. 
 
5. Belgium, worst in class on legal enforcement 
Similarly, one may regret that no mention is made by Antonio of the document titled ‘Progress Report 
2014: Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Foreign Corruption’, written 
for Transparency International by Fritz Heimann, Adam Földes and Gabor Bathory. In the latter 
report it appears that Belgium belongs to the lowest category of the 41 countries signatory of the 
OECD Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, as far as enforcement of this Convention is concerned. This means that 
Belgium belongs to a group of 22 countries with little or no enforcement of the OECD Convention, 
which was adopted in 1997, and which was meant to change quite radically the state of play in the 
international markets. 
Admittedly, legal enforcement is only a part of the solution – while corruption requires a holistic 
approach - but a near total absence of any form of efficient legal enforcement or, in other words, a 
quasi-impunity for those giving or receiving bribes may be seen as a clear omen that the authorities 
are not inclined to tackle seriously the issue of corruption in Belgium. It will therefore not be 
surprising to understand that the Belgian general public will be inclined, as Antonio wisely indicates in 
his report, to indulge in fatalism in front of corruption. 
  
37 
 
 
 
6. A first European Union report 
One may note, although it is a meager consolation, that Belgium is not alone in the European Union 
in this uneasy position on enforcement. The first European Union Anti-corruption Report of 2014 
underscores the uneven law enforcement and prosecution of corruption in different member 
countries of the European Union.  
 
One can i.a. read in this report that ‘corruption cases risk becoming time-barred where judicial 
procedures turn out to be excessively long and cumbersome’. The report also stresses that ‘in certain 
European countries successful prosecutions are rare or investigations lengthy and that the efficiency 
of law enforcement and prosecution in investigating corruption varies widely across the European 
Union’. 
 
7. Criminal law settlements 
It may be interesting to note on the subject matter of legal enforcement, that countries, which have an 
efficient criminal settlement procedure for bringing to an end corruption cases, are generally 
considered more apt to conduct successful legal enforcement of corruption cases. Corruption cases 
in those countries do not strand on time bars or on the excessive length of procedures. Concluding a 
settlement with suspected corruptors cuts short lengthy litigation (while at the same time saving 
management time) and often, but not always, offers the possibility to bring back the corruptor on the 
right track, through the appointment of a monitor. The victims may be compensated in time, the fine 
is collected and the case is successfully closed.  
Belgium has introduced by the Law of April 14, 2011 ‘on the extended criminal law settlement’ 
(painstakingly ‘corrected’ by the Law of July 11, 2011) a larger possibility to reach a criminal law 
settlement, even when litigation has already started before the courts. This act, although it doesn’t 
provide for all elements required to ensure proper publicity and although it does not guarantee 
equality of treatment of all citizens, probably contains interesting elements for improving our 
country’s legal enforcement position on corruptive practices.  
 
8. Is there a political will? 
The issue of lack of enforcement brings us to the next vexed question: is there in our country a 
sufficient political will to eradicate corruption?  
The government declaration of the present federal executive lacks any mentioning of a policy on how 
to tackle corruption. Contrary to what happened under previous governments, the government 
declaration, which forms the basis for all governmental action, is silent on the topic of corruption. 
Therefore our questioning: is political Belgium willing to give its anti-corruption policy a real top 
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priority in its political action plan? Or in other words: is the federal executive ready to use sufficient 
resources to combat what is seen by the international community as an evil to be fought against 
vigorously? 
 
9. A pressing need for more and better preventive action 
From a technical point of view, Belgium probably has the legal and regulatory means to fight 
corruption in its judicial system. The definitions of corruptive practices in the Belgian legal system are 
not fundamentally diverging from the international legal standards, as laid down in a number of 
international legal instruments, signed and ratified by Belgium. 
 
Weaknesses appear, however, as soon as one looks into matters of prevention in the public as well as 
in the private sector. Although more and more countries introduce legislation compelling 
corporations to install effective ethics and compliance programmes, our country continues to turn a 
deaf ear when told to introduce this kind of provision in its legal framework.  
An outstanding example in this field is the famous article 7 of the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 
(UKBA), whereby companies (‘organisations’) are held liable, whenever bribery is discovered, for not 
putting into place reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of a corruptive act. Likewise, one 
may refer to the semi-obligatory regulation contained in Annex II of the OECD Recommendation of 
November 26, 2009 or to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of the Department of Justice of the 
United States, which lists the several measures a corporation should take to have a proper anti-
corruption preventive system. 
And indeed, the need to be active on prevention appears more and more compelling. Adopting new 
legislation, touting new legal texts, while not seriously trying to introduce preventive measures is 
tantamount to doing nothing effective to combat the evil one formally condemns.  
 
10. Should there be a body for overseeing the preventive anti-corruption work? 
The ‘Comité supérieur de contrôle/ Hoog Comité voor toezicht’ (High Control Authority), which was 
probably one of the oldest- if not the oldest - anti-corruption agencies in the world, as it had been 
created in October 30, 1910, was in charge of anti-corruption preventive work in Belgium. It has been 
suppressed and never has been replaced in this capacity.  
Isn’t it time to give the ‘Office Central pour la Répression de la Corruption[OCRC]/ Centrale Dienst 
voor de Bestrijding van Corruptie [CDBC] (Central Office for the Repression of Corruption) this 
preventive function again? In that capacity the OCRC/CDBC could actively stimulate awareness-
raising about corruption in our country. 
Fulfilling such a task is clearly necessary in the public as well as in the private sector. 
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In the private sector, one should not only deal with large enterprises but also with small and middle-
sized ones. Companies of all sizes should be encouraged to put into place several serious and 
proportionate measures to combat corruption. To quote only a few: (i) establishing a code of ethics 
and a corporate ethics and compliance programme, (ii) creating an ethics and compliance function 
commensurate to the resources and size of the organization, (iii) giving employees and, to a certain 
degree, the company’s business partners, sufficient information on and training about the corporate 
integrity programme, (iv) installing reasonable management, control and audit systems capable of 
identifying, mitigating and, if possible, eliminating corruption risks and occurrences, (v) giving 
whistleblowers, who report in good faith serious attempted or real infringements of the law or of the 
corporate ethical rules, protection to speak up, and (vi) sanctioning in a dissuasive, fair and 
proportionate way any infringement of the law or of the corporate ethical rules. 
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